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Article
FAIR USE AND THE 1992 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 107 OF
THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT: ITS HISTORY AND AN
ANALYSIS OF ITS EFFECTt
DANIEL E. WANAT*
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 24, 1992, section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act
(Amendment or 1992 Amendment), which relates to fair use of
copyrighted works, was amended to add the following provision:
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon considera-
tion of all the above factors.'
The factors to which the Amendment refers are those originally en-
acted as part of section 107.2 None of those factors addressed the
relationship between published and unpublished copyrighted
t I wish to express my appreciation to Ms. Christie Mahn for her diligent
research efforts and editorial assistance without which this article would not have
been possible. Such errors as may be found in this work, of course, are mine
alone.
* B.A., 1968,J.D., 1971, DePaul University; LL.M., 1976, University of Illinois;
Professor of Law, Memphis State University School of Law. Professor Wanat co-
authored: Computer Software Gopyright Issues: Section 117 and Fair Use, 22 MEM. ST. U.
L. REv. 197 (1992) (with Stephen Kyle Tapp).
1. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. IV 1993). The congressional effort to amend § 107
as it applied to unpublished works began with the 101st Congress. 137 CONG. REC.
S13,924 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991) (Judiciary Comm. Rep.). The amendment to
§ 107 was prompted by two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit: Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 890 (1987), and New Era Publications, Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873
F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990). For a further discussion
of Salinger and New Era, see infra notes 42-75 and accompanying text.
These two decisions caused attorneys "for historians, biographers, other au-
thors and publishers [to] routinely advise their clients that almost any unauthor-
ized use of previously unpublished materials [would] subject them to a serious risk
of liability for copyright infringement." 137 CONG. REc. S13,924 (daily ed. Sept.
27, 1991).
From introduction of the bill through passage of the Amendment by the 102d
Congress, the Amendment's legislative history reflects an intention to remedy the
perceived chilling effect of Salinger and New Era. See 137 CONG. REc. S5648-49
(daily ed. May 9, 1991) (statements of Sens. Simon and Leahy); 137 CONG. REC.
S13,924-25 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1991) (Judiciary Comm. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 836,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (1992).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). Section 107 provides in part
(47)
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works and the fair use finding.3 In 1985, the United States
Supreme Court, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
Prises,4 decided that "[u]nder ordinary circumstances, the author's
right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated
expression will outweigh a claim of fair use."5
The author's right to control first publication appears to be the
focus of the 1992 Amendment to section 107.6 This Article will ad-
dress the relationship between the author's right of control and the
1992 Amendment.
First, the Article analyzes the right to control "undisseminated
expression," as considered by the Harper & Row Court and its prog-
eny.7 Second, the Article explores the limitations placed upon that
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho-
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringe-
ment of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall in-
clude-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
Id. The factors listed in § 107 are not exclusive. Courts, therefore, may consider
factors other than those expressly enumerated in § 107. See infra note 103 and
accompanying text.
3. The fact that § 107 does not expressly mention the published or unpub-
lished nature of the copyrighted work as a factor pertinent to the outcome of the
fair use issue does not manifest a legislative intention to render the published or
unpublished nature immaterial to the fair use analysis in a particular case. As the
House Report of the Committee on the Judiciary made clear: "The statement of
the fair use doctrine in section 107 offers some guidance to users in determining
when the principles of the doctrine apply. However, the endless variety of situa-
tions and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases pre-
cludes the formulation of exact rules in the statute." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
4. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
5. Id. at 555.
6. This right may be found among the exclusive rights granted by Congress to
copyright owners; namely, "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copy-
righted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1988).
7. The decisions of both the Supreme Court in Harper & Row and the federal
courts that followed it were criticized in writings published before the 1992
Amendment. See, e.g., Diane Conley, Author, User, Scholar, Thief. Fair Use and Unpub-
lished Works, 9 CARwozo ARTs & ENTrr. L.J. 15 (1990); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARv. L. Rzv. 1137 (1990); Andrea D. Wil-
liams, The Fair Use Doctrine and Unpublished Works, 34 How. L.J. 115 (1991); James
2
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right purportedly made manifest by the 1992 Amendment. Finally,
conclusions are set forth to assist courts and lawyers when attempt-
ing to apply the law of the 1992 Amendment in light of its legisla-
tive history and Harper & Row.
II. THE RIGHT TO CONTROL FIRST PUBLICATION: HARPFR &Row,
PUBLIHERS, IC. V NA TON EAVTERPISES
When the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, began to address the defendant Nation Enterprises' 8
defense of fair use to the claim of copyright infringement made by
Harper & Row, it first acknowledged several policy premises that
underscore the scope of the rights of a copyright owner.9 The
Court stated that these exclusive rights are given to add to a "har-
vest of knowledge" by enabling contributors to that harvest to ob-
tain a "fair return for their labors." 10 Moreover, the Court found
that Congress is authorized to grant these rights both to "motivate
. .. creative activity"" and to provide public access to the products
of that creative activity once the owner's exclusive rights have
expired. 12
Thereafter, the Court delineated the factual premises upon
which it would determine whether Nation Enterprises' fair use de-
fense would succeed. First, the work in question, A Time to Heal
President Ford's autobiography, was a copyrighted work.' 3 Second,
Nation Enterprises admitted to "lifting," verbatim, excerpts of the
Hall, Comment, Bare-Faced Mess: Fair Use and the First Amendmen4 70 OR. L. REv. 211
(1991).
8. Nation Enterprises admitted that it had copied verbatim excerpts from the
unpublished manuscript of the memoirs of President Gerald 11 Ford. Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 548.
9. Id. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in Harper & Row that was
joined by Justices White and Marshall. Id. at 579-605 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan characterized the majority's effort to focus on the unpublished
nature of the copyrighted work as one resulting in a "presumption against prepub-
lication fair use." Id. at 595 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice Brennan, this
presumption was contrary to Congress' intention that the issue of fair use be deter-
mined by the examination of a variety of factors on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 595-
97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 545-46.
11. Id. at 546 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984)).
12. Id. at 546. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
commonly referred to as "the Copyright Clause," grants Congress the authority to
legislate in the area of copyright. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 548. When outlining the evolution of the copy-
righted work at issue, the Court remarked that "the monopoly granted by copy-
right actively served its intended purpose of inducing the creation of new material
of potential historical value." Id. at 546.
1994]
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author's original language contained in the protected work.' 4 Fi-
nally, the Court concluded, and Nation Enterprises admitted, that
absent the fair use privilege, such "lifting" constituted copyright
infringement.' 5
To examine the Court's analysis of whether Nation Enter-
prises' use of the excerpts either violated Harper & Row's right to
control the first publication of A Time to Heal or constituted a fair
use requires a close look at certain premises. First, prior to incor-
poration of the fair use defense into the 1976 Copyright Act, the
defense's availability was judged from the perspective of the "rea-
sonable copyright owner."1 6 Thus the fairness of any unpermitted
use turned on whether the reasonable copyright owner impliedly
consented to that use.17 Generally, the reasonable copyright
owner's control of the work was nearly absolute in the case of an
unpublished work.' 8 Any unauthorized use, therefore, was not fair
unless either the copyright owner had voluntarily parted with the
right to control by authorizing publication or the work was de facto
published.19 In light of these premises, which traditionally limited
14. Id. at 548. According to the Court, when Nation Enterprises copied ex-
cerpts from the unpublished manuscript it "arrogated to itself the right of first
publication." Id. at 549.
15. Id. By accepting this premise, the Court avoided addressing the contro-
versial issue of whether Nation Enterprises infringed Harper & Row's copyright
not by using elements of the work actually covered by the copyright, but by en-
croaching upon "the originality embodied in the work as a whole." Id. at 548.
16. Id. at 549-50.
17. Id. Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, the issue of fair use
could arise as a matter of state law. Generally, state law regulated the rights of
authors in their copyrighted works until the event of publication.
The Act that preceded the 1976 Copyright Act expressly permitted such regu-
lation: "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the
author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to pre-
vent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his con-
sent, and to obtain damages therefor." 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1972) (amended 1976).
State law, which gave an author the right to control when and in what form to
first publish, also supported the strict rule prohibiting the fair use defense in cases
of unpublished works. H.R. RP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992).
18. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. Although it was clear that the right of
control was absolute until publication occurred, the circumstances that would
amount to a publication were less than clear. See, e.g., American Vitagraph v. Levy,
659 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1981) (contrasting divestive and investive publication);
King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (distinguishing be-
tween limited and general publication).
19. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. For example, de facto publications could
occur when a copyrighted work, such as a musical composition, was publicly per-
formed or disseminated to the public. See id. It was unclear under the law prior to
the 1976 Copyright Act, however, exactly what circumstances constituted a de facto
publication. See, e.g., Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) (holding unauthor-
ized public performance did not constitute publication sufficient to cause forfei-
ture of copyright); cf White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol1/iss1/4
1994] 1992 FAIR USE AMENDMENTS
the applicability of the fair use defense, Nation Enterprises sought
to persuade the Court that the defense should "apply in pari materia
to published and unpublished works" under the 1976 Copyright
Act.2 0 The Court flatly rejected this contention, finding that the
Act did not support it.21
The Court's reasoning focused primarily on the copyright
owner's right to control first publication. 22 That right included the
author's decisions of "whether and in what form to release his
work."23 The Court determined that the commercial value of this
right lies primarily in "exclusivity."24 Given this focus, it appears
that the right to control first publication found in the 1976 Copy-
(1908) (holding piano rolls, perforated musical sheets which pass through piano
and sound notes, were not copies for infringement purposes and thus-not copies
for publication purposes).
20. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552. Unlike its historical antecedents, the 1976
Copyright Act provided for a copyright in unpublished works from creation and, in
general, preempted state copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (1988). The right
to control first publication accorded to Harper & Row, therefore, was granted
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
21. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552. In 1975, the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, when reporting on the applicability of the fair use defense to unpub-
lished works, concluded:
The applicability of the fair use doctrine to unpublished works is narrowly
limited since, although the work is unavailable, this is the result of a delib-
erate choice on the part of the copyright owner. Under ordinary circum-
stances the copyright owner's 'right of first publication' would outweigh
any needs of reproduction for classroom purposes.
S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975).
The Court in Harper & Row used this language to support its finding that
Congress intended § 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act to be "narrowly limited" when
applied to infringements of unpublished works. 471 U.S. at 554.
Curiously, the Harper & Row Court borrowed a statement from the Senate
Report, which applied to reproduction of unpublished work for classroom pur-
poses, in support of a blanket statement of congressional intention to disfavor such
use. It appears that the Court should have interpreted this conclusion in the Sen-
ate Report as reflecting the Committee's intention to weigh the right to control
first publication against the need to reproduce for a certain purpose. Classroom
use is, of course, only one of a number of purposes that may be claimed to be fair.
22. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546-47. The Court focused on this right despite
the fact that the 1976 Copyright Act incorporates both the right of first publication
and the fair use defense while simultaneously preempting equivalent rights under
state law.
23. Id. at 553. The Court made clear that an author was no less deserving of
copyright protection because the author intended to publish. Id. at 555. This was
because the author's right to control first publication implicated "creative control"
and "prepublication rights" that benefitted the public as well as the author. Id.
24. Id. at 553. Illustrative of the Court's point is an agreement between
Harper & Row and Time, Inc. in which Harper & Row granted Time the exclusive
right to publish excerpts of memoirs shortly before the full length version was to
be distributed to bookstores. A second payment by Time to Harper & Row was to
be renegotiated should the subject material be otherwise published before its re-
lease by Time. Id. at 542-43.
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right Act is similar to the nearly absolute right found at common
law. 25 The Court thus concluded that the claim of fair use of an
unpublished work will ordinarily fail.2 6
Although in Harper & Row the Supreme Court recognized that
the fair use defense generally fails where the copyright infringe-
ment involved is the unauthorized use of an unpublished work, it
nevertheless analyzed Nation Enterprises' claim of fair use in light
of section 107 of the Copyright Act and its enumerated factors.27
Of particular importance to the Court's inquiry was the second fac-
tor of section 107, "the nature of the copyrighted work."28
Once the Court determined that A Time to Heal was unpub-
lished, it then concluded that such a characteristic "is a critical ele-
ment of its nature."29 The Court thereafter indicated that the
25. In support of its position, the Court relied on the CopvmGrr LAw REVI-
SION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE
UNITED STATES CoPYRIGHT LAw, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (Comm. Print 1961)
("overbalancing reasons to preserve the common law protection of undis-
seminated works until the author or his successor chooses to disclose them").
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553. For a further discussion of fair use prior to the
1976 Copyright Act, see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Nation Enterprises argued that
a different rule should apply when the material published is of "high public con-
cern," thus implicating the First Amendment. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555-56.
Under this argument, Nation Enterprises contended that the precise manner in
which an author expresses himself is as "newsworthy" as the content of the expres-
sion and thus prepublication use of the author's precise manner is privileged
under the First Amendment. Id. at 556.
The Court rejected this First Amendment argument for many reasons. Cen-
tral to each reason was the long-standing principle adopted to square copyright law
with the First Amendment: a copyright protects only the form of expression and
not the ideas expressed. Id.
Under this principle, the free dissemination of ideas is assured and First
Amendment values served. The newsworthiness of the expression, the Court ex-
plained, did not justify additional First Amendment protection at the expense of
the copyright owner who would lose the economic incentive provided by the copy-
right and thereby be discouraged from authorship, which would leave the public
with less or no material of social value to read. Id. at 557. The Court added that,
by negative implication, the First Amendment "freedom not to speak publicly"
would not be served if newsworthiness justified the unauthorized publication of
otherwise unpublished expression. Id. at 559.
27. Harper &Row, 471 U.S. at 561-69. Discussion of the Court's analysis of the
first and third fair use factors is omitted from this Article because the Court con-
cluded that neither factor served to support a finding of fair use. Id. at 561-66. In
effect, the Court applied the general rule that the unpublished nature of the work
at the time of the alleged infringement barred the fair use claim.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
29. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564. The Court also characterized A Time to
Heal as a "historical narrative or autobiography." Id. Although the factual nature
of the work weighed in favor of a fair use claim, the Court found that Nation
Enterprises' use exceeded that "necessary to disseminate the facts." Id. at 563-64.
This unnecessary use weighed against a fair use finding. Id. at 563.
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scope of fair use is narrower in unpublished works than in the case
of published works because of the unpublished nature of the
work.30 Finally, the Court reasoned that narrowing the scope of the
fair use defense was appropriate because the right to control first
publication includes the author's unique choices of whether,
"when, where, and in what form first to publish a work."3' This
combination of choices is not otherwise found among the rights of
a copyright holder under the 1976 Copyright Act.3 2 The right to
control first publication, therefore, is broader in scope than other
rights found within the Act and naturally leads to a narrower scope
of fair use.
The unpublished nature of A Time To Heal was also a fact signif-
icant to the Court's application of the final section 107 factor, "the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work."33 As a result of Nation Enterprises' unauthorized
publication, Time refused to pay Harper & Row $12,500 still re-
maining due under the terms of the contract between the parties,
in which Harper & Row sold to Time the right to serialize excerpts
from the work prior to its authorized first publication.3 4 The Court
thus concluded that Nation Enterprises' use clearly "competed for a
share of the market for prepublication excerpts" 3 5 and "pose [d] sub-
stantial potential for damage to the marketability of first serializa-
tion rights in general."36
The Supreme Court's opinion in Harper & Row opened the
door to litigation over the question of whether the unpublished na-
ture of the work dictated a stricter application of the section 107
fair use defense than the section 107 application given a published
work. As the case law explored in the next section of this Article
30. Id. at 564.
31. Id.; see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (enumerating exclusive rights of copyright
owner).
33. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
34. Id. at 567.
35. Id. at 568.
36. Id. at 569. In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that
§ 107(4) of the 1976 Copyright Act focused on the potential market for the copy-
righted work as well as the effect upon the value of the work. Id. at 566.
The Court also accepted the proposition that there was a market for prepubli-
cation excerpts. Id. at 568. Finding Nation Enterprises' use fair would risk damag-
ing the copyright owner's marketability of first serialization rights. Id. at 569. The
Court foresaw that uses similar to Nation Enterprises' use posed, in the aggregate,
a substantial threat to the potential market of the copyright owner. Id. This poten-
tial market for first serialization rights existed, of course, only as a result of the
exclusive right of the copyright owner to control the first publication of the work.
1994]
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reflects, the treatment given unpublished works was not only more
strict than the treatment given public works, but also appeared to
be moving, at times, toward a per se rule.3 7 This rule, when ap-
plied, would preclude the fair use defense regardless of the other
fair use considerations.
The issue of whether to adopt a per se rule that would elimi-
nate the fair use defense where the work at issue is unpublished
created a rift among the judges in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. The next section of this Article will
chronicle this split among the judges sitting within the Second
Circuit.
III. THE RIGHT TO CONTROL FIRST PUBLICATION AND THE
PROGENY OF HA-PR &Row
The decisions of the Second Circuit best exemplify the diver-
sity in interpretation and application of Harper & Row.38 The first
of those cases was Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 39 In Salinger, the
court examined the relationship between the fair use defense and
Harper & Row under circumstances where the unpublished works at
issue were several personal letters written by the well-known but re-
clusive author, J.D. Salinger. 40
37. The Court in Harper & Row is ambiguous regarding the effect of a work's
published or unpublished nature on the probable success of a fair use claim. Not
only did the Court analyze in detail the history and value of the author's right to
control the first publication of a work, but it also reached certain conclusions as
part of that analysis that could lead lower courts to conclude a use is unfair be-
cause the work used was unpublished. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying
text.
Even the part of the Harper & Row opinion in which the Court approached
the analysis of fair use from the perspective of the four factors of § 107 of the 1976
Copyright Act reflected the Court's tendency to emphasize the unpublished na-
ture of the work and the relationship of that characteristic to the work's value or
marketability. The Court's opinion could be interpreted as prescribing a rule of
general application which the Court believed was within the legislative intent. See
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
38. See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); Association
of Am. Medical Colleges v. Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
184 (1991); New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit is a significant circuit because it includes New York
City, the center of the publishing industry in the United States.
39. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 92. In the district court, Judge Leval's determination that the copy-
ing was "minimal" served as the basis for the district court's finding of fair use. Id.
at 94. Judge Leval's consideration of factors other than the unpublished nature of
personal letters marks the beginning of the split among trial and appellate judges
of the Second Circuit concerning the proper application of the fair use doctrine
8
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The court began its fair use analysis in Salinger by stating that:
"Central to this appeal is the application of the defense of 'fair use'
to unpublished works."41 Taking its cue from Harper & Row, the
court in Salinger noted that "the [Supreme] Court underscored the
idea that unpublished letters normally enjoy insulation from fair
use copying."42
As a result, the Salinger court expressly stated that it would
place "special emphasis on the unpublished nature of Salinger's let-
ters."43 The court then proceeded to examine the circumstances of
Salinger in light of the section 107 factors.
Harper & Row's impact on the Salinger court's section 107 anal-
ysis is evidenced in the Second Circuit's consideration of the nature
of the copyrighted work at issue. Following its assessment, the Salin-
ger court concluded that two propositions may be drawn from
Harper & Row. The first is that normally the expression found in
unpublished works is protected completely from being copied. 44
The second is that there is a "diminished likelihood" that copying is
fair if the work is unpublished. 45 Although the court's reasoning in
support of these propositions is clearly stated, it lacks the particu-
lars that would make it persuasive. In this regard, the court in Salin-
ger relied on "the tenor of the [Supreme] Court's entire discussion
of unpublished works."46
The court in Salinger interpreted Harper & Row as enlarging
the copyright owner's right to control the first publication of a work
by narrowing the circumstances under which an infringement of
under Harper & Row. See generally Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HA~v. L. REv. 1105 (1990) (arguing fair use analysis should be premised on consid-
eration of value of unpublished work to public in relation to value of claimed fair
use).
41. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95. Prior to recognizing that the unpublished nature
of the copyrighted works was pivotal to the fair use analysis, the court stated that a
personal letter is an authored literary work. Id. at 94. As with any such work, the
letter's "expressive content" is the subject of a copyright. Id. at 95; see generally Alan
Lee Zegas, Note, Personal Letters: A Dilemma for Copyright and Privacy Law, 33
RuTGERS L. Rxv. 134 (1980).
42. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 95.
43. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 97.
45. Id. (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit also rejected the proposi-
tion suggested in Harper & Row that the fair use defense is narrower in scope for
unpublished works because the quantity of the work that may be copied is less than
it would be if the work were published. Id. By rejecting this proposition, the Sec-
ond Circuit eviscerated the de minimis copying rationale to support a finding of
fair use. For a further discussion of the de minimis copying rationale, see supra
note 40.
46. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97.
1994]
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that right could successfully constitute a fair use. If Salinger was the
beginning of a pattern before the Second Circuit, historians and
biographers would be relegated to reporting only the facts sur-
rounding persons of interest.47 In this regard, the public benefit of
access to unpublished copyrighted materials would have to await
either an authorized publication or the copyright's expiration.48
Two questions arise from the Salinger decision. Did it mark the
beginning of a line of authority that would enlarge authors' right to
control the first publication of their works and, consequently, re-
duce the number of instances in which copying is a fair use? Would
the relationship between the right to control first publication and
the fair use defense require that the outcome of each case would
continue to be fact-dependent? The answers to these questions
were soon forthcoming, beginning with the opinions ofJudge Leval
for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York49 and the Second Circuit in New Era Publications International,
ApS v. Henry Holt & Co.50
In New Era, the unpublished materials at issue included the
personal diaries and journals of L. Ron Hubbard. 51 These materi-
als and parts of Hubbard's published works were reproduced in
Bare-Faced Messiah, a biography that purported to expose the fictive
nature of Hubbard's public image as a "romantic adventurer and
philosopher."52
47. The Salinger court indicated, however, that the efforts of these classes of
authors would not be affected significantly and the enhancement of "public knowl-
edge" would continue with little harm. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100.
Whether the court was correct in its prognostication depends significantly
upon the abilities of historians and biographers to distinguish fact, unprotected by
copyright, from expression, which copyright protects. History teaches that making
this distinction may be extremely difficult. Compare Hoehling v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980) (holding that
copyright only covers author's original expression of facts in historical accounts)
with Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) (holding that
copyright embraces translations of historical writings). Even the Supreme Court in
Harper & Row sought to avoid the task of making this distinction. See supra note 15
and accompanying text.
48. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100. In a case like Salinger, the likelihood of an au-
thorized publication appears slim if not non-existent. Id. at 92 (author claimed
that he would not permit letters to be published during his lifetime). If publica-
tion does not occur, public access will have to await not only the death of the
author but it may also have to await the passing of fifty years thereafter. 17 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1988).
49. New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094
(1990).
50. 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990).
51. Id. at 579.
52. Id. at 578-80. Hubbard was the founder of the Church of Scientology. Id.
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In the district court opinion in New Era, Judge Leval concluded
that "given Salingeis strong presumption against a finding of fair use
for unpublished materials," the use of a small amount of such mate-
rial, "but more than [a] negligible size," precluded the availability of
the fair use defense to the defendant charged with copyright in-
fringement.53 In reaching his conclusion, Judge Leval acknowl-
edged that he was compelled to so decide "under [the] mandate of
the Salingeropinion."54 In fact, the judge noted that, were it not for
the Salinger opinion, he would have found that the defense of fair
use had been demonstrated as to the unpublished works that were
reproduced. 55
In this regardJudge Leval opined that the unpublished nature
of the materials that were reproduced did not negate the fair use
defense, but merely argued against its application.5 6 The court ad-
ded that when the fair use defense is raised in the context of un-
published materials, "the defendant must establish a highly
convincing case in favor of fair use."57 According to Judge Leval,
the defendant in New Era established this by demonstrating a
"powerfully compelling fair use purpose" in addition to other fac-
tors relevant to the success of the fair use defense. 58
The purpose to which Judge Leval referred was of exposing
Hubbard's character flaws by using Hubbard's own words.59 Exam-
ples of other factors thought by the judge to justify a fair use find-
ing included the use of Hubbard's expressions to demonstrate the
variety of his character flaws and the complex nature of his
personality.6
Judge Leval also recognized that when the material used is un-
published, the test for determining whether the use is fair is "nar-
53. New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1524 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1523.
57. Id.
58. New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1523-25. Judge Leval believed that the biogra-
pher's "use of the author's particular words to demonstrate the validity of an im-
portant critical point... [such as] demonstrations of traits of character" was a use
of those words "not as a matter of literary expression[,] but for what the choice of
words reveals about the subject." Id. at 1523-24.
Judge Leval, it seems, recognized that, while the biographer must be limited
to reporting facts about the subject, there are instances where the important facts
are the "words themselves." Id. at 1524. The necessity of using the subject's choice
of words in these instances justifies favoring the defendant.
59. Id. at 1524.
60. Id.
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rower" in scope. 61 When, however, the use made is to enliven text
or to communicate significant points, these purposes should pro-
vide a compelling reason to determine that the materials' use is
fair.62 Nevertheless,Judge Leval felt compelled by the Salingeropin-
ion to conclude that these uses likewise did not constitute a fair
use.
63
It is clear from the district court opinion in New Era that the
Second Circuit's Salinger opinion compelled Judge Leval to apply
certain propositions in his analysis of the unpublished works. In
fact, but for Salinger, Judge Leval would have reached a different
result and sustained the fair use defense. 64
When appeal was taken in New Era, the Second Circuit made
two distinct findings important to its resolution of the fair use issue.
First, the court found that regardless of the Salinger decision's spe-
cial emphasis on the unpublished nature of the work, the defend-
ant's use of the copyrighted materials was not a fair use under the
four factors set forth in section 107.65 Second, the court reviewed
Judge Leval's analysis of the relationship between the unpublished
nature of the materials reproduced and the fair use defense. The
Second Circuit rejected Judge Leval's reasoning in its entirety.66
Assessing the district court's application of Salinger, the court
of appeals concluded that the second fair use factor "weighs heavily
in favor of [New Era]," because the court in Salinger made it clear
that "unpublished works normally enjoy complete protection." 67
Thus it appears that the court of appeals' opinion in New Era crys-
tallized the second fair use factor of section 107. In fact, the peti-
61. Id. at 1503.
62. Id. at 1524.
63. Id. The uses Judge Leval described were not present in New Era. Rather,
they were present in Salinger, where Judge Leval found them to constitute a fair
use. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811
F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
64. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
65. New Era, 873 F.2d at 583 (making clear that three of four fair use factors
favored New Era).
66. Id. at 584. Chief Judge Oakes, in a separate concurring opinion, ex-
pressed concern that the majority unnecessarily took issue with Judge Leval and so
appeared to "cast in concrete Salinger." Id. at 585 (Oakes, CJ., concurring). For
Chief Judge Oakes, the relationship between the unpublished nature of the work
at issue and fair use required that the alleged infringer convincingly demonstrate
that despite the nature of the work, the use is fair. Thus the fair use analysis would
remain flexible, dependent on consideration of all the relevant factors. Id. at 587-
95 (Oakes, CJ., concurring); see also James L. Oakes, Copyrights and Copyremedies:
Unfair Use and Injunctions, 18 HoVsrnR L. REv. 983 (1990).
67. New Era, 873 F.2d at 583.
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tion for rehearing and petition for a rehearing en banc were
denied.68
It appeared doubtful that the New Era and Salinger decisions
would culminate in a per se rule precluding any fair use claim in
the context of an unpublished work. In this regard, Judge Miner,
although concurring with the majority's decision on the rehearing
petitions, filed a separate opinion, in order to address this issue in
more detail.69 Judge Miner reiterated that the denial of both peti-
tions reflected a commitment to the application of settled law.70
The law to which Judge Miner referred was that of Harper & Row.7 1
For Judge Miner, the decision in Harper & Row "teaches that
unpublished, copyrighted material very rarely will be the subject of
fair use. It recognizes that the right not to publish is a most impor-
tant one."72 In Judge Miner's opinion, however, a fair use of an
unpublished work is rare, but may exist based on application of all
of the fair use factors.73
Judge Newman dissented from the denial of New Era's petition
for a rehearing en banc.74 Judge Newman felt the rehearing was
necessary to clear up the misconception that researchers, biogra-
phers and journalists might believe that they may not copy some
small amount of an author's unpublished expression in order to
disseminate information fairly and accurately.75 Implicit within
Judge Newman's concern is that such use is fair and should be so
stated by the majority to minimize the risk of lawful users being
sued for infringement. Implicit as well, is Judge Newman's rejec-
tion of a per se rule that would prohibit such a use from being
found fair.
The question of whether or not a per se rule existed within the
Second Circuit precluding the fair use of an unpublished work con-
68. 884 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir. 1989).
69. Id. at 660 (Miner, J., concurring). Judges Meskill, Pierce and Altimari
joined in this opinion. Id. (Miner, J., concurring); see also RogerJ. Miner, Exploit-
ing Stolen Text: Fair Use or Fair Play ?, 37J. COPMRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 1 (1989).
70. New Era, 884 F.2d at 660 (2d Cir.) (Miner, J., concurring), cet. denied, 493
U.S. 1094 (1990).
71. Id. (Miner, J., concurring). For a further discussion of Harper & Row, see
supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
72. New Era, 884 F.2d at 660 (Miner, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
73. Id. (Miner, J., concurring). Judge Miner noted that this case simply was
one in which the rare use did not exist. Id. (Miner, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 661 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judges Kearse and Winter and Chief
Judge Oakes concurred in this opinion. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting); see alsoJon
0. Newman, Not the End of History: The Second Circuit Struggles with Fair Use, 37 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 12 (1989).
75. New Era, 884 F.2d at 663 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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tinued with the opinion in Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.76 In Wright,
the court of appeals concluded, after evaluating the unpublished
materials which were copied, that the defendants used more than
just factual content. The court found that the defendants repro-
duced "borderline expression" of the author, about whom defend-
ants had written a biography.77 Concluding that the defendants did
in fact use unpublished expression, the court found that the un-
published nature of the copied materials favored the plaintiff
under factor two of section 107.78
The court followed the analyses of Salinger and New Era in arriv-
ing at this finding.79 After characterizing unpublished works as the
"favorite sons" of factor two, the court in Wright recognized: that the
scope of fair use was narrow; that it was yet to be applied in favor of
the infringer; that the factor weighs heavily in favor of the copyright
owner and that little room for discussion exists when unpublished
expression is copied. °
However, the court in Wright, unlike the courts in Salinger and
New Era, ultimately found that the defendants' use of the unpub-
lished expression was fair. In doing so, the court rejected the prem-
ise that Harper & Row and earlier Second Circuit decisions had
established a per se rule precluding a fair use finding in cases of
unpublished works."' As the court stated: "The fair use test re-
mains a totality inquiry, tailored to the particular facts of each case.
Because this is not a mechanical determination, a party need not
'shut-out' her opponent on the four factor tally to prevail."8 2 The
76. 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991). From the time that New Era was decided
until the Wright decision, there was one other Second Circuit case worthy of brief
note: Association of American Medical Colleges v. Carey, 728 F. Supp. 873
(N.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd sub nom. Association of American Medical Colleges v.
Cuomo, 928 F.2d 519 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 184 (1991).
In Carey, the unpublished nature of the work compelled the district court to
enter summary judgment on the fair use issue under the authority of Salinger and
New Era. 728 F. Supp. at 885-86. In a decision that was a portent of things to come,
the Second Circuit reversed after finding that factors other than the unpublished
nature of the copyrighted work were to be considered in evaluating the claim of
fair use. Cuomo, 928 F.2d at 523-26.
77. Wright, 953 F.2d at 736. The materials the court found to be expression
protected under the 1976 Copyright Act embodied the "creative style" of Richard
Wright, the subject of the biography. Id. To a certain extent, therefore, the pro-
tected materials in Wright were analogous to those found by the court in Salinger to
be copied unfairly. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
78. Wright, 953 F.2d at 738.
79. See supra notes 41-46, 65-67 and accompanying text.
80. Wright, 953 F.2d at 737.
81. Id. at 739-40.
82. Id. at 740.
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court was able to find for the defendants because after a detailed
examination of the other factors deemed relevant by the court to
section 107 analysis, all of the others aside from "the nature of the
copyrighted work" favored the defendants. 83
The Wright opinion clarified the Second Circuit's position on
the status and effect of the unpublished nature of the work copied:
The nature of work factor found in section 107 of the 1976 Copy-
right Act weighs heavily in favor of the copyright owner where more
than de minimis protected expression is used.8 4 The weight ac-
corded the unpublished nature of the work with respect to the
other section 107 factors, however, remained unclear.
Before the Second Circuit or the other courts of appeal had
much opportunity to continue with the judicial evolution of the
principles of Harper & Row, Congress intervened and amended sec-
tion 107.85 This Article will now analyze the Amendment.
IV. THE 1992 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 107 OF THE COPYRIGHT
ACT: AN ANALYSIS
In March 1992, a bill was introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives that was intended to make manifest the legislative conclu-
sion that no per se rule of unfair use in cases of unpublished works
exists.86 The bill, with little change in text, was passed by voice vote
in both the House and Senate. 7 The bill became law on October
24, 1992.88
Although Congress considered a possible per se rule of unfair
use in the context of unpublished works, its reaction was to affirm
the historical understanding of the nature of the defense. The Re-
port of the Committee on the Judiciary, compiled in 1976, chroni-
cles part of the 1976 Copyright Act's history and reflects this
legislative understanding:
83. Id. In particular, the court found that the defendants' work was a schol-
arly work, a biography that contributed to the public's understanding of the biog-
raphy's important subject. Id. In addition, the court concluded that the biography
was non-exploitative and would not adversely affect the market for the works of the
subject-novelist. Id. Finally, the court found that the use made of unpublished
expression was "modest" and not designed to "enliven her [the biographer's]
prose." Id.
84. Id.
85. H.R. REP. No. 836, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992).
86. Id. at 1. In a little over one month's time, the bill was reported on favora-
bly by the House Committee on the Judiciary to the full House. Id. at 2.
87. 138 CONG. RSc. S17,358 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1992); 138 CONG. Rxc. H7991
(daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992).
88. Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145(1992).
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Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the
fair use doctrine over and over again, no real definition of
the concept has ever emerged. Indeed, since the doctrine
is an equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable defi-
nition is possible, and each case raising the question must
be decided on its own facts.8 9
In addition, the bill was introduced in response to the concerns of
authors and their publishers over the effect of the Salinger and New
Era decisions on the authorship of biographical and historical
works.9 0
The principal concern expressed by authors and publishers
about the Salinger decision was that the Second Circuit, by rejecting
the defendants' fair use defense, refused to recognize the practical
dilemma that a biographer faces in either "risking infringement by
copying verbatim, or distorting his or her subject's meaning by put-
ting the passage in the biographer's own words."91 In fact, accord-
ing to the court in Salinger when too much verbatim copying
occurs, the biographer "deserves to be enjoined."92
The publishers' other concern involved the statement in Salin-
ger that unpublished works "normally enjoy complete protection."93
The decision in New Era further heightened this concern against
such a rule of general application that would require substantial
proof to overcome. 94
89. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976). Inconsistent with this
history of the claim of fair use is its common law application to unpublished works.
See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
90. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 4. The Supreme Court's opinion in Harper & Row
lays, of course, at the bottom of these concerns. Id. at 5; see supra notes 9-36 and
accompanying text.
91. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 5. When the court in Salinger addressed the issues
surrounding verbatim copying or paraphrased distortion, it reasoned that a biogra-
pher does not run a risk of infringement when he copies facts which, under copy-
right, he is free to do. 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987). The court added that
distortion is unlikely when facts are copied. Id.
If, however, the biographer copies "more than minimal amounts" of the sub-
ject's copyrighted expression, he may be copying the attribute that is precisely pro-
tected by copyright. Id. For example, the biographer in Salinger copied the
subject's "vividness" of expression. Id. The court in Salinger thus concluded that
such copying was not a fair use and could be enjoined despite the fact that a biog-
rapher may be subject to criticism for leaving the "vividness" of another's expres-
sion out of his work. Id.
92. 811 F.2d at 96; see also H.R. REP. No. 836 at 6 (referring to Salinger court's
position).
93. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 6 (citing Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97); see supra notes 41-
43 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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The House Report, when addressing the opinion in New Era,
found that the court's decision "echoed" the conclusion of Salin-
ger.95 The Report also noted that the Second Circuit was sharply
divided on the unpublished works and fair use issues.96 The Wright
court's decision, however, that "[n]either Salinger, Harper & Row,
nor any other case . .. erected a per se rule regarding unpublished
works,"97 was referred to with approval in the Report.98
The House Report also provided examples of instances other
than Wright where the fair use defense may prevail in the context of
unpublished works:
[I] n some circumstances it would be a fair use to copy an
author's unpublished expression where necessary to re-
port fairly and accurately a fact set forth in the author's
writings... . "Often, it is the words used by [a] public fig-
ure (or the particular manner of expression) that are the
facts calling for comment["] [sic] .99
The Report appears to address Harper & Row in two ways: first, by
indicating that incorporating quotes from the unpublished work
may be a fair use and second, by indicating that the manner of ex-
pression of a public figure when copied may be a fair use. The
inference may be drawn, therefore, that the Supreme Court erred
in refusing to embrace special "user friendly" considerations, ad-
verse to public figures, when interpreting the section 107 fair use
defense. 100
The House Report also criticized the decision in Harper & Row
based on the Court's ambiguous statement that "the scope of fair
use is narrower with respect to unpublished works."101 The Report
95. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 6.
96. Id.
97. Wright 953 F.2d at 740.
98. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 6.
99. Id. at 8 (footnote omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting New Era, 884
F.2d 659, 660 (2d. Cir. 1989) (Miner, J., concurring). In suggesting that it may be
a fair use to copy unpublished expression as an adjunct to fair reporting, the Re-
port appears to accept the wisdom of Judge Newman's dissent from the denial of
the petition for a rehearing en banc in New Era Id. at 8 n.27.
100. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. If the defense of fair use is to
remain a flexible one, it is unlikely that special rules will evolve within federal
courts that work to the detriment of authors who are public figures. Just as the
unpublished nature of the work does not justify a per se rule of unfair use, the
status of the work's author as a public figure ought not support a per se rule that
the use is fair.
101. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 8; see supra note 29 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Nation Enterprises' unsuccessful attempt to advance First Amendment argu-
ment before Court in Harper & Row).
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likewise rejected the court's interpretation in Salinger of this ambig-
uous language, which the court construed to mean that unpub-
lished works "normally enjoy complete protection against copying
any protected expression." 102 Instead, the Report accepted the
Copyright Office's interpretation of Harper & Row. The Copyright
Office concluded that the unpublished nature of the copied expres-
sion does not lead to a "diminished likelihood that the fair use de-
fense, as a whole, will in every case not be available."103
After examining and evaluating the existing case law interpret-
ing the application of section 107 to copyright infringement of un-
published works, the Committee on the Judiciary next expressed its
intention behind the proposed Amendment to section 107. The
Committee stated:
This [amendment] has a narrow, but important purpose:
to reiterate Congress's intention in codifying fair use that
in evaluating a claim of fair use, including claims involving
unpublished works, the courts are to examine all four stat-
utory factors set forth in Section 107, as well as any other
factors deemed relevant in the court's discretion. 10 4
The Report adds that the Amendment's purpose can be fulfilled by
courts in two ways. First, courts can construe the Amendment as
written. 0 5 This construction eliminates the per se rule that would
preclude a successful claim of fair use in any case.' 0 6
Second, courts can examine those factors made explicit in sec-
tion 107.107 The court, in its discretion, should assess factors in ad-
dition to those found in the statute.' 08 The Committee recognized
102. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 8 (quoting Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811
F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987)); see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
103. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 9. The House Report did, however, affirm the
Supreme Court's finding in Harper & Row that, for purposes of the second statu-
tory factor, "the unpublished nature of the work is a 'key, though not necessarily
determinative' factor tending to negate a defense of fair use." Id. (citing Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985));
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The proposed amendment read as follows: "The fact that a work is
unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors." Id. The Committee intended that the word
"itself' within the proposal be interpreted to insure a meaning that precluded a
per se rule. Id. The proposal, unchanged in this regard, was enacted into law in
1992. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. H.R. REP. No. 836 at 9.
108. Id. at 9-10. The Committee intended to make manifest this way of ac-
complishing the proposed amendment's purpose by use of the phrase "all the
above factors" in its text. Id. at 9. This phrase was to be construed "to encompass
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that the Supreme Court in Harper & Row correctly held that courts
have the discretion to consider factors other than those found in
section 107 when analyzing a fair use claim.1 9
The 1992 Amendment, if applied as suggested by the House
Report, grants to the copyright owner of an unpublished work a
right of control that is the "key" to defeating a claim of fair use.110
Although a "key" factor, the right to control is not absolute. It must
be analyzed together with the other fair use factors illustrated in
section 107 as well as other factors that courts find relevant to indi-
vidual cases.1 1'
V. CONCLUSIONS
Several lessons can be learned from the chronology of Harper
& Row through the 1992 Amendment and its legislative history.
First, the rule of fair use under the state laws of copyright where the
right to control the publication of an unpublished work would pre-
clude the successful application of the fair use defense did not nec-
essarily become a part of the 1976 Copyright Act. Rather, section
107, as originally enacted, was intended to be a flexible defense not
bound by per se rules.
Second, the right to control the first publication of an unpub-
lished work is distinguishable under the 1976 Copyright Act from
other rights found within it. In this regard, the right to control may
be considered the "key" element in a fair use analysis and so one
upon which that analysis may turn in favor of the copyright owner.
Third, although the copyright owner's right to control the first
public dissemination of his work is a "key" element in the fair use
analysis, the claim of fair use may succeed if the other fair use fac-
tors apply. These elements may be found in section 107 of the
Copyright Act or may be independently recognized by federal
courts.
the terms 'including' and 'such as' embodied in the preamble to Section 107,
terms that are defined in Section 101 of Title 17 as being 'illustrative and not
limitative.'" Id. at 9-10.
109. Id. at 9 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 562-63 (1985) (considering defendant's bad faith in using purloined
"manuscript")).
110. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. In this regard, the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in Harper & Row appears sound and should be followed.
111. The core of § 107 analysis, premised on both those factors expressly enu-
merated in § 107 and others deemed relevant through judicial fiat, is founded on
the judicially created right of the public to control dissemination of an unpub-
lished work in relation to the claim of fair use. See supra note 40 and accompany-
ing text.
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Finally, for the 1992 Amendment to achieve the results out-
lined by the House Judiciary Committee as indicated in its Report,
federal courts must recognize that the hallmark of a claim of fair
use is its equitable character, even in cases of the right to control
the first publication of unpublished works. The failure or success
of a fair use claim, therefore, depends upon the use of reason
under the circumstances of individual cases. The 1992 Amendment
and its history provide for the courts the latest such reminder.
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